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Abstract
Assignment problems where both sets of agents are countably infi-
nite, the so-called infinite assignment problems, are studied as well as
the related assignment games. Further, two solutions for these games
are studied. The first one is the approximate f-core for games with
a finite value. This particular solution takes into account that due
to organisational limitations only finite groups of agents can protest
against proposals of profit distributions. Second, we study the utopia
payoff, the perfect proposal in which each agent receives the maximal
amount he can get.
Keywords: cooperative games, assignment problems, infinite pro-
grams, solutions.
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1 Introduction
An assignment problem is a problem in which agents of two types have to
be matched or assigned to each other. Assigning agent i from one type to
agent j from the other type generates a nonnegative profit aij . The goal
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is to match the agents in such a way that the total profit is as large as
possible. Examples of assignment problems in real-life are the marriage
market where men and women are matched, and a factory where workers
have to be assigned to tasks or machines.
Shapley and Shubik [5] studied this problem in a game-theoretic setting
for finite sets of agents. They introduced cooperative assignment games. In
these games the value of a coalition of players equals the maximal profit
that can be obtained from matching agents within this group. Sa´nchez-
Soriano, Llorca, Tijs and Timmer [3, 4] considered cooperative games related
to semi-infinite assignment problems, following the study in [2]. These are
assignment problems in which one of the two sets of agents is countably
infinite.
This paper studies infinite assignment problems and corresponding games.
These problems are an extension of semi-infinite assignment problems since
there are a countably infinite number of agents of each type. The main
question we address is whether there exist allocations of the total profit
that all (groups of) agents find “reasonable”. In game-theoretic terms, we
investigate whether the core of the assignment game is nonempty. For this
end, two cases are considered.
First, if the optimal total profit is finite then it is hard to analyse the
assignment game. It is not clear whether the core could be empty. Therefore,
the approximate f-core is introduced. This is a set of allocations of the total
profit that all finite groups of agents find reasonable since they cannot do
better on their own. It turns out that the approximate f-core is a nonempty
set.
Second, if the optimal total profit is infinite then there seem to be many
candidates for nice allocations. We propose a single allocation, the so-called
utopia payoff. This core-element has the nice property that it fulfills the
wishes of all the agents. Further, a comment is added about avoiding infinite
payoffs in this setting.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In the next section infinite as-
signment problems and assignment games are introduced. Section 3 studies
the approximate f-core as a solution for problems with a finite value. The
utopia payoff is introduced in section 4 as a solution for infinite assignment
problems with an infinite value. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Infinite assignment problems and games
In an infinite assignment problem two types of economic agents have to be
matched. Each type is available in a countable, infinite amount. Matching
agent i from one type to agent j of the other type generates a profit aij ≥ 0.
The goal is to match the agents in such a way that the total profit is as high
as possible.
An infinite assignment problem A is described by a tuple (M,W,A).
M and W represent the two countably infinite sets of agents and A is an
M ×W -matrix containing the nonnegative profits aij . For ease of notation
we assume that M and W are equal to {1, 2, 3, . . .} = N.
The highest total profit that can be achieved from assigning agents in
M to agents in W equals
vp(A) = supX
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈W
aijxij
s.t.
∑
i∈M
xij ≤ 1,∑
j∈W
xij ≤ 1,
xij ∈ {0, 1}, for all i ∈ M, j ∈ W.
Here, xij = 1 if and only if agent i ∈ M is assigned to agent j ∈ W and
X = [xij ]ij∈M×W is the assignment matrix. The first two conditions ensure
that each agent is assigned to at most one other agent. Because of the infinite
character of this problem, the highest total profit is obtained by taking the
supremum over all matchings. An assignment is an injective function π :
M → W . For each assignment matrix X there is a corresponding assignment
πX with πX(i) = j if xij = 1. Conversely, for each assignment π there is
a corresponding assignment matrix X with xij = 1 if j = π(i) and xij = 0
otherwise. An assignment π for A is called optimal if ∑i∈M aiπ(i) = vp(A).
If the matrix A is bounded, supij∈M×W aij < ∞, the value vp(A) may
be infinite or finite as the example below shows.
Example 1 Let A be an infinite assignment problem with
A =

1 1 1 . . .
1
2
1
2
1
2 . . .
1
3
1
3
1
3 . . .
...
...
...
. . .
 .
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Here vp(A) =∞ which can easily be seen by taking the assignment π(i) = i.
Given an assignment problem A let An be the finite subproblem of A
restricted to the first n agents of both types: An = (Mn,Wn, An) where
Mn = Wn = {1, . . . , n} and An = [aij ]ij∈Mn×Wn .
Example 2 LetA be the infinite assignment problem with aij = 21−min{i,j},
that is,
A =

1 1 1 1 . . .
1 12
1
2
1
2 . . .
1 12
1
4
1
4 . . .
1 12
1
4
1
8 . . .
...
...
...
...
. . .

.
Let k ∈ N. The value of the finite problem A2k is 4(1− 2−k), which can be
obtained from the assignment π2k(i) = 2k + 1 − i. The value of A2k tends
to vp(A) = 4 as k goes to infinity.
From this example we can learn that if vp(A) < ∞ then the matrix A is
bounded from above. Further, we have seen an infinite assignment problem
where the value of the finite subproblem tends to the value of the original
problem: limn→∞ vp(An) = vp(A) < ∞. This relation holds in general.
Lemma 3 For all infinite assignment problems A with vp(A) < ∞ it holds
true that limn→∞ vp(An) = vp(A).
Proof. First we show that {vp(An)}n∈N is a nondecreasing sequence. Let
πn be an optimal assignment for An. Then the assignment πn+1, defined by
πn+1(i) =
{
πn(i) if i ≤ n
n + 1 if i = n + 1.
for i = 1, . . . , n + 1 is an assignment for An+1. Thus,
vp(An+1) ≥
n+1∑
i=1
aiπn+1(i) =
n∑
i=1
aiπn(i) + an+1,n+1 ≥ vp(An).
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Second we show that vp(An) ≤ vp(A), for all n ∈ N. Let πn be an optimal
assignment for An. Then the assignment π, defined by
π(i) =
{
πn(i) if i ≤ n,
i i > n,
for all i ∈ M , is an assignment for A. Similarly as above we can show that
vp(An) ≤ vp(A).
Finally, let ε > 0. Then there exists an assignment π for A such that∑
i∈M
aiπ(i) ≥ vp(A)− ε/4.
Further, there exists an l ∈ N such that
l∑
i=1
aiπ(i) ≥ vp(A)− ε/2.
Take m = max{π(1), . . . , π(l)}, then for all n ≥ m
vp(An) ≥
m∑
i=1
aiπ(i) ≥ vp(A)− ε/2.
We conclude that lim
n→∞ vp(An) = vp(A). 
For a finite assignment problem like An it has been shown, in e.g. [1],
that if the integer condition xij ∈ {0, 1} is replaced by xij ≥ 0 then there
still exists an optimal solution with integer values for the xij . With this new
condition it is easy to see that the dual problem for An is
min
∑
i∈Mn ui +
∑
j∈Wn vj
s.t. ui + vj ≥ aij ,
ui, vj ≥ 0, for all i ∈ Mn, j ∈ Wn,
with optimal value vd(An). A pair (u, v) ∈ IRMn× IRWn is a feasible solution
for this dual program if it satisfies the constraints. It is an optimal solution
if it is feasible and satisfies
∑
i∈Mn ui +
∑
j∈Wn vj = vd(An).
For finite assignment problems it is known that there is no duality gap,
which means that vp(An) = vd(An), and there exists an optimal assignment
and an optimal dual solution. In the sequel we investigate whether this also
holds for infinite assignment problems. For this, let us start with the proof
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of lemma 3 where we have shown that for a given ε > 0 there exists an m
such that
vp(A) ≥ vp(An) ≥ vp(A)− ε/2 (1)
for all n ≥ m. We use these inequalities to construct a sequence of feasible
dual solutions for Am. Let (ul, vl) be an optimal dual solution for Am+l for
l = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Define the map sl by
sl(u1, . . . , um+l; v1, . . . , vm+l) = (u1, . . . , um; v1, . . . , vm).
Hence, the map sl shortens the pair (u, v) by deleting the last l coordinates
of both u and v. Now {sl(ul, vl)}∞l=0 is a sequence of feasible dual solutions
for Am. Notice that this sequence lies in a compact set. Without loss of
generality, assume that the limit of this sequence exists (otherwise take a
subsequence) and let
(u, v) = lim
l→∞
(sl(ul, vl)) (2)
denote this limit.
Lemma 4 For all infinite assignment problems A with vp(A) < ∞ and for
all ε > 0 with corresponding limit given by (2) it holds true that vp(A) ≥∑m
i=1 u¯i +
∑m
j=1 v¯j ≥ vp(A)− ε/2.
Proof. Because the limit (u, v) of the sequence {sl(ul, vl)}∞l=0 lies in a com-
pact set and {sl(ul, vl)}∞l=0 is a feasible dual solution for Am,
m∑
i=1
ui +
m∑
j=1
vj ≥ vd(Am) = vp(Am) ≥ vp(A)− ε/2,
where the last inequality follows from (1).
According to (2), given η > 0 there exists an l0 such that for all l ≥ l0
maxi,j≤m
{∣∣uli − ui∣∣ , ∣∣∣vlj − vj∣∣∣} ≤ η2m . Thus,
uli − ui ≥ −
η
2m
and vlj − vj ≥ −
η
2m
(3)
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for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. Now we have
vd(Am+l)−
 m∑
i=1
ui +
m∑
j=1
vj

=
m+l∑
i=1
uli +
m+l∑
j=1
vlj −
m∑
i=1
ui −
m∑
j=1
vj
=
m∑
i=1
(uli − ui) +
m+l∑
i=m+1
uli +
m∑
j=1
(vlj − vj) +
m+l∑
j=m+1
vlj
≥ −η
2
+ 0− η
2
+ 0 = −η.
The last inequality follows from (3) and the nonnegativity of (ul, vl). Hence,
vd(Am+l)+η ≥
∑m
i=1 ui +
∑m
j=1 vj for all η > 0. Now let η go to zero. From
vd(Am+l) = vp(Am+l) and vp(Am+l)→ vp(A) as m + l →∞ (see lemma 3)
we conclude that vp(A) ≥
∑m
i=1 ui +
∑m
j=1 vj . 
Given an infinite assignment problem A = (M,W,A) we can define a
corresponding cooperative game (N,w) with transferable utility (TU). This
game, which we call an assignment game, has an infinite player set N =
M ∪W , by which we mean that any player corresponds to either an agent
in M or W and vice versa, any agent in M or in W corresponds to a player.
A coalition S of players is a subset of N . The function w assigns to each
coalition S the payoff w(S), and by convention w(∅) = 0.
Let MS = M∩S and WS = W ∩S. Then a coalition S receives w(S) = 0
if S = MS or S = WS because in these cases there are no agents from the
other type to be assigned to. Otherwise, w(S) = vp(AS) where AS is the
(infinite) assignment problem (MS ,WS , [aij ]i∈MS ,j∈WS ).
3 The approximate f-core
In this section we study a solution for assignment games with a finite value,
namely the approximate f-core. Let ε > 0 and let (N,w) be a cooperative
game with a countably infinite player set N and w(N) < ∞. The approx-
imate f-core of such a game is the set of allocations z ∈ RN that satisfy
ε/2-efficiency :∑
i∈N
zi ≥ w(N)− ε/2, (4)
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and ε-stability for finite coalitions:∑
i∈S
zi ≥ w(S)− ε (5)
for all coalitions S ⊂ N for which |S| < ∞. The approximate f-core, with
the ‘f’ standing for ‘finite’, resembles the idea that only finite coalitions are
able to protest against an allocation z. This is based upon the fact that
coordination among agents is expensive (in terms of money and time) and
these costs are increasing in the number of agents. Furthermore, in real-life
it is impossible to coordinate a group of infinite size.
Consider an infinite assignment problem A with vp(A) < ∞. For ε > 0
let (u¯, v¯) be the limit pair as in (2). Define the pair (û, v̂) ∈ RM × RW
by uˆ = (u¯1, . . . , u¯m, 0, 0, . . .) and vˆ = (v¯1, . . . , v¯m, 0, 0, . . .). So, û and v̂ are
obtained from u and v, respectively, by adding an infinite number of zeros.
This pair belongs to the approximate f-core of the corresponding assignment
game.
Theorem 5 For all infinite assignment problems A and corresponding as-
signment games (N,w) with w(N) < ∞, (û, v̂) is an element of the approx-
imate f-core of (N,w).
Proof. Let A be an infinite assignment problem and (N,w) the corre-
sponding assignment game with w(N) < ∞. Let ε > 0. According to (1)
and lemma 4 there exists a number m such that
w(N) = vp(A) ≥
m∑
i=1
u¯i +
m∑
j=1
v¯j
=
m∑
i=1
uˆi +
m∑
j=1
vˆj =
∑
i∈M
uˆi +
∑
j∈W
vˆj
≥ vp(A)− ε/2 = w(N)− ε/2.
Hence, ε/2-efficiency, (4), is satisfied.
To show ε-stability, we have to show that∑
i∈MS
uˆi +
∑
i∈WS
vˆj ≤ w(S)− ε (6)
for all finite coalitions S. Let S be such a coalition. If w(S)−∑i∈MS uˆi −∑
i∈WS vˆj < 0 then we are done since 0 < ε.
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Otherwise,
w(S)−
∑
i∈MS
uˆi −
∑
i∈WS
vˆj =
∣∣∣∣∣∣w(S)−
∑
i∈MS
uˆi −
∑
i∈WS
vˆj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (7)
Let l ≥ m be such that
MS ,WS ⊂ {1, 2, . . . ,m + l}, (8)
all players in S are included, and such that
max
i,j≤m
{
|uli − u¯i|, |vlj − v¯j |
}
≤ ε
4m
, (9)
the pair (ul, vl) is close to the limit (u¯, v¯). From (8) it follows that
w(S) = vp(AS) = vd(AS) ≤
∑
i∈MS
uli +
∑
i∈WS
vlj . (10)
Define MmS = {i ∈ MS | i ≤ m} and WmS = {j ∈ WS | j ≤ m}. Using (10),
we can expand (7) as follows.
w(S)−
∑
i∈MS
uˆi −
∑
i∈WS
vˆj
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣w(S)−
∑
i∈MS
uˆi −
∑
i∈WS
vˆj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈MS
uli +
∑
i∈WS
vlj −
∑
i∈MS
uˆi −
∑
i∈WS
vˆj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈MS
uli +
∑
i∈WS
vlj −
∑
i∈MmS
u¯i −
∑
i∈WmS
v¯j
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
i∈MmS
|uli − u¯i|+
∑
i∈WmS
|vlj − v¯j |
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈MS\MmS
uli +
∑
j∈WS\WmS
vlj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (11)
Observing that
vp(A) ≥ vp(Am+l) = vd(Am+l) =
m+l∑
i=1
uli +
m+l∑
j=1
vlj
9
and
m∑
i=1
uli +
m∑
j=1
vlj ≥ vd(Am) = vp(Am) ≥ vp(A)− ε/2,
where the last inequality follows from (1), leads to
ε/2 = vp(A)− (vp(A)− ε/2)
≥
m+l∑
i=1
uli +
m+l∑
j=1
vlj −
m∑
i=1
uli −
m∑
j=1
vlj
≥
∑
i∈MS\MmS
uli +
∑
j∈WS\WmS
vlj . (12)
Hence, starting from (11) we get
∑
i∈MmS
|uli − u¯i|+
∑
i∈WmS
|vlj − v¯j |+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈MS\MmS
uli +
∑
j∈WS\WmS
vlj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
i∈MmS
ε
4m
+
∑
i∈WmS
ε
4m
+ ε/2
≤ ε, (13)
where the first inequality is due to (9) and (12). Combining (11) and (13)
gives (6), the desired result. 
4 The utopia payoff
A second solution for assignment games is the utopia payoff. If A is an
infinite assignment problem then the utopia payoff is a pair (u∗, v∗) defined
by u∗i = supj∈W aij and v
∗
j = supi∈M aij . Player i ∈ M receives the amount
u∗i and player j ∈ W receives v∗j . Notice that the components of (u∗, v∗)
may take the value ∞.
If vp(A) < ∞ then it is very likely that the utopia payoff is not efficient,
that is, the total amount that the players receive is larger than w(N) =
vp(A). In example 2 the utopia payoff (u∗, v∗) is given by u∗i = v∗j = 1 for
all i and j. Thus
∑
i∈M u
∗
i +
∑
j∈W v
∗
j =∞ > vp(A) = 4.
If, on the other hand, vp(A) =∞ then
vd(A) = vp(A) =∞ (14)
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because of weak duality (vp(A) ≤ vd(A)). In this case, the utopia payoff is
efficient.
To obtain vp(A) = ∞ the matrix A may be unbounded or bounded. In
example 1 the matrix A is bounded, vp(A) = ∞ and all utopia payoffs u∗i ,
v∗j are finite. Infinite utopia values are also possible, as the next example
shows.
Example 6 Let A = (M,W,A) be an infinite assignment problem where
A =

1 2 3 . . .
2 3 4 . . .
3 4 5 . . .
...
...
...
. . .
 .
Then vp(A) =∞ and u∗i = v∗j =∞ for all i and j.
If vp(A) =∞ then the utopia payoff is not only efficient but it also is an
element of
C(w) =
{
(u, v) ∈ RM+ ×RW+
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈MS ui +
∑
j∈WS vj ≥ w(S) for all S ⊂ N∑
i∈M ui +
∑
j∈W vj = w(N)
}
,
the core of the corresponding assignment game (N,w).
Theorem 7 For all infinite assignment problems A with vp(A) = ∞ and
corresponding assignment game (N,w), (u∗, v∗) ∈ C(w).
Proof. The utopia payoff (u∗, v∗) is a feasible solution of the program
inf
∑
i∈M ui +
∑
j∈W vj
s.t. ui + vj ≥ aij
ui, vj ≥ 0, for all i ∈ M, j ∈ W.
with value vd(A), since u∗i + v∗j ≥ aij ≥ 0 for all i and j. Thus
∞ ≥
∑
i∈M
u∗i +
∑
j∈W
v∗j ≥ vd(A) = vp(A) =∞
where the first equality comes from (14). From this we conclude that∑
i∈M u
∗
i +
∑
j∈W v
∗
j = vp(A) = w(N).
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Furthermore, let S be a coalition. The restriction of (u∗, v∗) to S is a
feasible solution of the program
inf
∑
i∈MS ui +
∑
j∈WS vj
s.t. ui + vj ≥ aij
ui, vj ≥ 0, for all i ∈ MS , j ∈ WS
with value vp(AS). Thus
∑
i∈MS u
∗
i +
∑
j∈WS v
∗
j ≥ vd(AS) ≥ vp(AS) = w(S).
We conclude that (u∗, v∗) ∈ C(w). 
If vp(A) = w(N) =∞ then any player in N can receive any amount that
he likes from w(N) because there is enough. Thus it is not really surprising
that the utopia payoff, representing the most desired payoff, is an element
of the core of the assignment game.
In a sense it is strange to think of payoffs that may equal ∞. One may
also replace the value ∞ by some very large amount, say k. This way we
deal with payoffs that are bounded from above by k. This amount k is
such that the players are very content if they receive k and they consider
it to be “incredibly” large. Let the k-bounded utopia payoff be the payoff
(u∗(k), v∗(k)) defined by u∗i (k) = min{u∗i , k} and v∗j (k) = min{v∗j , k} for all
i ∈ M and j ∈ W .
Theorem 8 For all infinite assignment problems A with vp(A) = ∞ and
related assignment game (N,w), the k-bounded utopia payoff (u∗(k), v∗(k))
is a feasible distribution of w(N),∑
i∈M
u∗i (k) +
∑
j∈W
v∗j (k) ≤ w(N)
and for all coalitions S whose players have utopia values of at most k∑
i∈MS
u∗i (k) +
∑
j∈WS
v∗j (k) ≥ w(S)
Proof. By definition∑
i∈M
u∗i (k) +
∑
j∈W
v∗j (k) ≤
∑
i∈M
u∗i +
∑
j∈W
v∗j = w(N) =∞
where the equality follows from theorem 7. Next, if S is a coalition of players
whose utopia values are at most k then∑
i∈MS
u∗i (k) +
∑
j∈WS
v∗j (k) =
∑
i∈MS
u∗i +
∑
j∈WS
v∗j ≥ w(S)
where the inequality also follows from theorem 7. 
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5 Concluding remarks
This paper presented a study on infinite assignment problems and corre-
sponding assignment games. We distinguished two cases. First, assignment
problems with a finite value were considered. The approximate f-core was
introduced for assignment games and shown to be nonempty. Here there
are some open questions like “Do there exist core-elements?” and “Is there
a duality gap?”.
Second, we considered problems with an infinite value. For this case, the
utopia payoff was introduced and shown to be a core-element. We ended
with a slight modification, namely the k-bounded utopia payoff. This payoff
avoids the problem of having to pay an infinite amount to a player.
Some directions for future research are already mentioned. Infinite as-
signment problems with a finite value are not that easy to analyse. The part
on utopia payoffs can be extended to cover infinite transportation problems
in the same way as in Sa´nchez-Soriano et al. [4].
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